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Abstract:  
It is widely acknowledged that the new emerging discipline cognitive science 
of religion has a bearing on how to think about the epistemic status of religious 
beliefs. Both defenders and opponents of the rationality of religious belief have 
used cognitive theories of religion to argue for their point. This paper will look 
at the defender-side of the debate. I will discuss an often used argument in 
favor of the trustworthiness of religious beliefs, stating that cognitive science 
of religion shows that religious beliefs are natural and natural beliefs ought to 
be trusted in the absence of counterevidence. This argument received its most 
influential defense from Justin Barrett in a number of papers, some in 
collaboration with Kelly James Clark. I will discuss their version of the 
argument and argue that it fails because the natural beliefs discovered by 
cognitive scientists of religion are not the religious beliefs of the major world 
religions. A survey of the evidence from cognitive science of religion will 
show that cognitive science does show that other beliefs come natural and that 
these can thus be deemed trustworthy in the absence of counterevidence. These 
beliefs are teleological beliefs, afterlife beliefs and animistic theistic beliefs. 
Keywords: cognitive science of religion, religious epistemology, 
trustworthiness, reformed epistemology, natural beliefs. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
It is widely acknowledged that the new emerging discipline called cognitive science of religion has 
a bearing on how to think about the epistemic status of religious beliefs. Both defenders and 
opponents of the rationality of religious belief have used cognitive theories of religion to argue for 
their point. This paper will look at the defender-side of the debate. I will discuss an often used 
argument in favor of the trustworthiness of religious beliefs, stating that cognitive science of 
religion shows that religious beliefs are natural and natural beliefs ought to be trusted in the absence 
of counterevidence. This argument received its most influential defense from Justin Barrett in a 
number of papers, some in collaboration with Kelly James Clark. I will discuss their version of the 
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argument and argue that it fails because the natural beliefs discussed by cognitive scientists of 
religion are not the religious beliefs Barrett and Clark have in mind and are not any of the beliefs of 
the major world religions like Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Hinduism or Buddhism. I will also 
argue that cognitive science does show that some other beliefs come natural and that these can thus 
be deemed trustworthy in the absence of counterevidence. These beliefs are teleological beliefs, 
afterlife beliefs and animistic theistic beliefs.  
In section 2, I lay out the argument in support of the trustworthiness of religious beliefs on 
the basis of naturalness. In section 3, I provide an overview of the scientific findings from cognitive 
science of religion that is used to argue for the naturalness of religious belief and in section 4, I 
argue that the scientific findings do not suffice for the argument discussed in section 2. In the last 
section, I discuss the beliefs for which cognitive science of religion does provide trust. 
 
2. Naturalness of Religious Beliefs as Justification 
 
An argument in the debate over the philosophical implications of the cognitive science of religion 
states that cognitive theories of religion increase the epistemic status of religious beliefs because 
they show that religious beliefs are natural. The argument was most prominently defended in 
several articles by Justin Barrett; both in papers of his hand alone and in collaboration with Kelly 
James Clark [3], [4], [5], [8], but has its roots in work by Alvin Plantinga [39]. They claim that it is 
rational1 to trust natural outputs of human cognitive mechanisms as long as there are no good 
reasons to doubt them. Since cognitive theories of religion allegedly show that religious beliefs are 
natural outputs of human cognitive mechanisms2, they ought to be trusted as well. Plantinga added 
that natural outputs are only trustworthy in absence of defeaters (see below) and hence grants them 
an ‘innocent-until-proven-guilt status’. Although they do not discuss it explicitly, Barrett and Clark 
seem to think there are no defeaters for religious beliefs. 
The argument runs as follows: 
1. Religious beliefs are natural outputs of cognitive mechanisms. 
2. Natural outputs of cognitive mechanisms are trustworthy in the absence of defeaters. 
3. Therefore, religious beliefs are trustworthy in the absence of defeaters. 
The argument is formally valid; if both premises are true, so is the conclusion. The ‘innocent-until-
proven-guilty principle of rationality’ [15, p. 10], on which the second premise relies, goes back in 
Western philosophy to Thomas Reid (1710–1796). According to the principle, beliefs that humans 
form spontaneously or find themselves having, should be trusted as long as there is no evidence to 
the contrary. The principle is sometimes connected with relying on common sense. Plantinga 
refined this principle, stating that outputs of properly functioning cognitive mechanisms, following 
a good design plan, in a suited environment, successfully aimed at truth should be deemed 
trustworthy [39]. Relying on the outputs of our cognitive mechanisms is usually motivated by 
claiming that the alternative would lead to radical, or at least far reaching, skepticism. Thomas 
Reid’s common sense philosophy is sometimes considered an anti-sceptic alternative to David 
Hume [6], [43]. Plantinga’s views on proper functioning were partly motivated by his critique on 
older evidentialist views which he thought were too stringent [38, pp. 70–71]. The idea is that 
relying on the outputs of cognitive mechanisms without further confirmation is necessary for all 
sorts of beliefs which we consider true and requiring evidence for them is too big of a task. For 
example, people rely on it for beliefs about the existence of an external world and other minds 
without ever having considered the evidence in favor or against their belief. Plantinga argues that 
since the outputs of our cognitive mechanisms are usually deemed trustworthy, making an 
exception for religious beliefs is uncalled for [37].  
For Plantinga, proper functioning is closely linked to a design plan; a mechanism is 
functioning properly when its function follows the intention of the design plan. A design plan need 
not result from a personal designer as Plantinga allows for an evolutionary design plan [39]. Barrett 
and Clark use the term ‘natural’ instead of ‘proper functioning’. They do not refer to a design plan 
and adopt a more general strategy. Especially Justin Barrett stresses how our cognitive make-up 
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naturally produces religious beliefs [3], [5]. He uses the term ‘natural’, not as opposed to 
supernatural, but roughly as the opposite of cultural or learned. Natural beliefs are thus those that 
arise spontaneously, independently of culture or upbringing. In this regard, a natural belief can be 
defined as follows: 
Belief p is a natural belief iff p is produced independently of culture or upbringing. 
The term ‘natural’ is thus used as a synonym of ‘intuitive’ or ‘spontaneous’. The naturalness 
of religious beliefs is important because beliefs that (partly) result from culture or upbringing can 
no longer unambiguously be called mere outputs of cognitive mechanisms. Although beliefs are not 
automatically rendered untrustworthy when resulting from culture or upbringing, their 
trustworthiness depends on many factors, like the reliability of testimony. As a result, they do not 
enjoy the same innocent until-proven-guilty status but require additional arguments to defend their 
rationality.3  
Authors relying on common sense or defending an innocent-until-proven-guilty stance 
towards natural outputs of cognitive mechanisms are, however, not naïve. According to Plantinga, 
outputs of properly functioning mechanisms can be overridden by defeaters. In his discussion of 
Christian religious beliefs, Plantinga writes: “The claim [of those who argue against the 
trustworthiness of religious belief] is that there are serious defeaters for Christian belief: 
propositions we know or believe that make Christian belief (…) irrational (…)” [39, p. 358].4 
Barrett and Clark write: “(…) [w]e can trust beliefs produced by our cognitive faculty until that 
belief is undermined or defeated by stronger or better corroborated beliefs” [15, p. 10]. As a result 
the innocent status of natural beliefs is always preliminary since we cannot know what future 
defeaters will be found. Plantinga argues that there are no convincing defeaters for religious 
beliefs5. Barrett and Clark seem to hold similar views. 
What does and does not count as religious is notoriously hard to define. Barrett and Clark 
are not clear on what they mean with ‘religious beliefs’. They mainly discuss ‘belief in God’ and at 
one point ‘belief in spirits or polytheism’ [15, p. 11]. The term ‘God’ of course also lacks a uniform 
definition. In analytic philosophy of religion, ‘God’ is often defined as a perfect being, having 
perfect qualities like omniscience and omnibenevolence. In Abrahamic traditions, God is a 
transcendent, very powerful being who created the cosmos. In older polytheistic religions, gods are 
associated with natural phenomena like the wind or the oceans and some modern day animistic 
religions use the word ‘god’ in a similar way. Many Indian religions use the term ‘god’ to refer to 
celestial beings who have attained a higher (spiritual) status than ordinary humans. Barrett and 
Clark do not specify what they mean by the term. Their papers do make it clear that they are writing 
from a Christian perspective. We can thus safely assume that their understanding of the term ‘God’ 
comes close to the Abrahamic understanding where God is a transcendent, very powerful being who 
created the cosmos.  
The conclusion of the argument does not state that religious beliefs are trustworthy. To make 
this claim, one must argue that no defeaters are available. Defenders of this kind of arguments 
devote most of their attention to defending the second premise. Most criticisms are also aimed at 
this premise [18, pp. 194–199], [44], [24]. Some critics have granted both premises and the 
conclusion but argue that there are successful defeaters for religious belief [16], [35]. Some authors 
have attacked the first premise. Jason Marsh argues that the wide diversity in religious beliefs poses 
a problem for thinking that religious beliefs are natural outputs of our cognitive mechanisms [32]. 
Jonathan Jong, Christopher Kavanagh and Aku Visala argue that the God of classical theism does 
not match the idea of God that comes naturally and therefore appear to deny the first premise [27]. 
My argument is different since it does not involve the God of classical theism but religious beliefs. 
Although there may be some overlap between some religious beliefs and the God of classical 
theism, the overlap is limited and religious beliefs move well beyond the God of classical theism. 
In this paper, I will grant the second premise and focus on the first premise. I will argue that 
the first premise does not hold under scrutiny because religious beliefs move well beyond the 
natural outputs of properly functioning cognitive mechanisms and often even contradict them. For 
this purpose, a closer look at the evidence from cognitive science of religion is needed.  
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3. What Natural Beliefs? 
 
Clark and Barrett claim that recent insights from cognitive science of religion support the first 
premise stating that religious beliefs are natural outputs of cognitive mechanisms. Indeed many 
authors in cognitive science of religion subscribe the claim that religious belief is natural.6 In this 
section, I will survey the evidence from cognitive science of religion in support of this claim. A 
number of cognitive theories of religious beliefs can be used as evidence. Since the theories in 
cognitive science of religion are diverse, I will focus on the most widely discussed theories and 
distinguish three groups; one suggesting that a number of natural beliefs prepare the way for 
religion, one suggesting that theistic beliefs themselves are acquired easily and naturally, and one 
suggesting that people naturally find themselves having theistic beliefs. All theories I will discuss 
put the emphasis on unconsciously formed, intuitive beliefs rather than on consciously formed, 
reflective beliefs.7 They all suggest that religious beliefs should primarily be explained on the level 
of the first kind of beliefs. In all this, a caveat must be made that none of the claims about natural 
beliefs discussed below should be taken as established. Although some are better confirmed than 
others, none of them is uncontroversial.8  
Some psychologists suggest that a number of beliefs of importance for religion emerge 
naturally during childhood development. Though these natural beliefs cannot be called religious 
themselves, they are thought to prepare the way for religious beliefs or make the acquisition of 
religious belief easy. A first kind of natural beliefs is teleological beliefs. Deborah Kelemen and her 
team observed that children are prone to give teleological explanations for phenomena where 
teleology is absent [29], [30]. When children were asked questions like ‘What are clouds for?’ or 
‘What are lions for?’, many of them gave answers along the lines of ‘Clouds are for raining.’ and 
‘Lions are for visiting in the zoo.’ Older children were less likely to give similar answers and adults 
usually gave mechanistic, non-intentional answers. However, when adults were asked to answer 
question under time pressure, they were again more likely to give teleological answers [30]. A study 
on Romanian Gypsies showed that adults who had not received much education were more likely to 
give teleological answers [13]. According to Kelemen, these results provide evidence for the claim 
that humans have a general bias to treat objects and behaviors as existing for a purpose. After 
learning scientific (i.e. mechanistic, non-intentional) explanations for phenomena, the bias recedes 
but does not completely disappear. According to Kelemen, ‘promiscuous teleology’ is believed to 
be a conceptual prerequisite for intuitive theism [30]. 
A second kind of preparatory natural beliefs are beliefs about mind-body dualism. 
According to Paul Bloom, it is not controversial that naïve physics is different from naïve 
psychology and therefore people think of physical entities in different terms than psychological 
entities. Bloom claims the difference results in the intuitive belief that the mind is distinct from the 
body or can exist separately from it. Experiments showed that young children tend to believe that 
the brain is only responsible for some mental activities, like solving math problems, but not others, 
like pretending to be a kangaroo or loving one’s brother. They believed the latter activities are done 
by persons and not by their brains. Mind-body dualism is thus a by-product of people having two 
different cognitive systems, one for physical entities and one for psychological entities. This 
dualism makes it possible to imagine an immortal soul and immaterial gods [11]. Bloom’s common 
sense dualism is closely related to the third kind of natural beliefs, immortality beliefs.  
Jesse Bering and his colleagues concluded from experiments that children intuitively believe 
that people continue to have psychological states after biological death [9], [10]. In one experiment, 
children watched a puppet show in which one character died. When the children were asked 
whether the dead puppet still had mental states, they tended to answer in the positive. For older 
children and adults, not all mental states continued after death but mainly epistemic, emotional and 
desire states like ‘being hungry’ or ‘being sad’ [9].  
Teleological beliefs are very different from beliefs about mind-body dualism or afterlife but 
these (kinds of) beliefs are similar insofar that they are believed to prepare the way for religion. 
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Bloom suggests that a combination of these beliefs is needed to arrive at religious beliefs but 
Kelemen and Bering seem to believe that one is enough. None of the authors discusses in greater 
detail how the intuitive beliefs result in religiosity. They do suggest that religiosity is the evident 
next step when the intuitive beliefs are in place. For example, Paul Bloom writes: “The proposal 
here is that there are certain early-emerging cognitive biases that give rise to religious belief. (…) 
These biases make it natural to believe in Gods and spirits (…). These are the seeds from which 
religion grows” [11, p. 170]. 
A second group of theories has also gone one step further and argued that belief in God itself 
is acquired easily and naturally. Justin Barrett argued that humans tend to overdetect agency. Upon 
hearing sounds like rustling of leaves or seeing things like a branch that resembles a snake, people 
tend to believe that they are caused by or are agents. Barrett suggests that this was evolutionarily 
beneficial for our ancestors; detecting too many agents was much safer than detecting one too little 
because detecting one too little could have resulted in not noticing an approaching predator. Usually 
the initial beliefs about agency are overruled by checking the environment and finding an 
explanation for the perceived phenomenon. Sometimes no explanation is found and then humans 
will tend to infer that an invisible agent caused the phenomenon. Once the presence of an agent is 
inferred, humans will begin reasoning about the agent and form more elaborate beliefs about its 
nature [2]. 
Kurt Gray claims that humans intuitively look for a moral agent and a moral patient in 
situations they experience as morally significant; moral agents being those who do good or bad, and 
moral patients being the recipients of good and bad [22]. In situations where people find themselves 
as moral patients (e.g. when they are harmed or helped) but cannot find a human moral agent, they 
form beliefs about an ultimate moral agent. Clear examples of such situations are natural disasters. 
For Gray, belief in God is thus intimately tied to beliefs about morality. People can thus infer to 
God both in good and bad situations but Gray suggests bad situations are more likely to lead to 
belief in God. Gray finds support for his theory in studies stating that suffering and belief in God 
are significantly correlated [23].  
Jesse Bering argued for something similar like Gray and Wegner but in his view people 
(unconsciously) infer to God when experiencing meaningful events. He claims that people have an 
‘existential theory of mind’, a cognitive system that allows people to attribute meaning to certain 
experiences. Meaning is intuitively connected to agency so when people experience something as 
meaningful they look for an agent who invested the event with meaning. For some meaningful 
experiences no human meaning giver is to be found. For example, in the case of a beautiful sunset 
which is experienced as meaningful or again a natural disaster, no human can be pointed to as 
meaning giver. In these cases, people will infer to an ultimate meaning giver according to Bering 
[7]. 
Barrett, Gray and Bering all suggest that vague theistic beliefs are acquired naturally. 
Although vague, the theistic beliefs are not just the bare belief in the existence of a god, but belief 
in (a) divine agent(s) for Barrett, in a divine moral actor for Gray and in a divine generator of 
meaningful events for Bering. On the three theories, people arrive at theistic beliefs in different 
ways but they are not mutually exclusive. Gray explicitly connects his theory to Barrett’s [23], and 
all are similar in claiming that theistic beliefs result from an overly active cognitive mechanism. 
These three theories are less well backed up by empirical evidence than theories from the first 
group. Bering offers some limited evidence himself but Barrett and Gray leave it at stating their 
theory. 
A third group of theories states that people naturally find themselves having theistic beliefs. 
The difference with the previous group is that these theories suggest that theistic beliefs are not so 
much acquired after experiences of agency, morality or meaning, but rather preprogrammed by our 
evolutionary history. One influential theory connects belief in God to social cooperation [36], [41]. 
Defenders of this theory note that people rely on social cooperation for their survival to a far greater 
extent than any other animal. Our ancestors already had to make arrangements to coordinate the 
activities of the tribe (hunting, food gathering, etc.) and with the emergence of states coordination 
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became even more important. A problem is that people can forego their obligation and rely on the 
efforts of others because no one can be sure if someone will keep their promises. When people have 
the belief that a God with full access to people’s intentions and desires is watching them and that 
this God will punish or reward people in accordance to their obedience to the norms, people are far 
more likely to keep their promises and cooperate. As a result, tribes with the belief in God were 
more successful in surviving and belief in God was inherited. A number of philosophers have 
argued that this evolutionary story might have been God’s way of letting Himself be known [34]. 
Another theory suggests that gods function as attachment figures who provide comfort and 
alleviate psychological stress. Belief in God is said to provide a safe haven in times of distress and 
serve as a secure base for risky and challenging endeavors. In this regard, attachment to God is 
similar to attachment to parental figures [20], [21]. Lee Kirkpatrick suggests that believing in God 
as an attachment figure could be evolutionarily beneficial, but holds that this is not very important 
for the theory [31]. An evolutionary account would account for why people would naturally find 
themselves with beliefs about a divine attachment figure. To my knowledge, implications of an 
evolutionary account have not been discussed by philosophers but this could also be God’s way of 
letting Himself be known. 
Both theories share the suggestion that people naturally have vague theistic beliefs. In 
contrast to the second group, both theories have little to say on how theistic beliefs are acquired but 
rather suggest that people naturally find themselves having these beliefs. Their beliefs are also not 
bare theistic beliefs but belief in in a morally concerned, all-seeing god for the social cooperation 
theory and in a comforting, loving god for the attachment theory. The theories are also not as well 
backed up by empirical evidence as theories of the first group. Empirical evidence for evolutionary 
theories is of course more difficult because they cover processes stretching over millennia that 
cannot be repeated. 
 
4. Natural Religious Beliefs? 
 
Now does the evidence from cognitive science of religion establish the first premise, stating that 
religious beliefs are natural outputs of properly functioning cognitive mechanisms? At first glance, 
the answer should be negative for the vast majority of religious beliefs. Although the major world 
religions are very diverse, it is safe to say that most of them move well beyond the intuitive beliefs 
from the first group of theories. Teleology is filled in a number of very different ways; Abrahamic 
religions will state that the teleology in nature flows from the will of God and many Indian religions 
will state that teleology results from the universal laws of karma. Religious traditions that subscribe 
to mind-body dualism also do not rest at the belief that the mind is somehow different from the 
body but hold that mind and body are separated after death. Many religious traditions also have 
beliefs about what will happen after death that are much more elaborate than the belief that 
psychological states will continue. 
All theistic religions9 also move beyond the vague theistic beliefs discussed by the second 
and third group of theorists. No cognitive theory states that full-blown religious beliefs, like belief 
in the Trinity or the avatara of Vishnu, are the natural outputs of our cognitive mechanisms. Often 
cognitive scientists will admit that culture plays an important role in shaping religious beliefs. If 
that is the case, religious beliefs can no longer themselves be called the natural outputs of our 
cognitive mechanisms10 because natural is defined in opposition to cultural or learned (see section 
1). Clark and Barrett acknowledge this point but respond with: “(…) [T]he initial function of the 
godfaculty [Clark and Barrett’s term for the cognitive mechanisms producing theistic beliefs] (…) 
is to make humans aware (…) of the sacred dimension of reality rather than clearly defined Judeo-
Christian conceptions of God (…)” [14, p. 187]. Their response does not avoid the problem. If only 
awareness of the sacred dimension of nature comes naturally, only the belief that nature has a 
sacred dimension is shown to be trustworthy by their argument and not the Judeo-Christian 
conceptions of God. To argue for the trustworthiness of religious beliefs more will be needed. 
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Defendants could also respond that current cognitive theories still provide some reasons for 
trusting religious beliefs because important elements, like belief in God, do come naturally. This is 
a valid response but since those theories claiming that theistic beliefs are natural only discuss vague 
theistic beliefs the trust will be limited. Complex theistic beliefs, like the Christian belief in the 
Trinity, move very far from the vague theistic beliefs discussed by the second and third group of 
theories in section 2. If vague theistic beliefs come natural this gives some trustworthiness to the 
Christian belief in the Trinity but the trustworthiness is of the same order like the trustworthiness 
article 10 of the Belgian constitution, stating that all Belgian citizens are equal before the law and 
hence allowed to hold public and military office,11 gets from the natural, intuitive belief that people 
should be treated equally. Moving from a vague theistic belief to the belief that God created the 
world, became incarnate, and sends his Spirit to live in each of us, requires many intermediate steps 
which do not come naturally and need to be rendered trustworthy on other grounds.  
The first premise of the argument can also be relaxed, stating that religious beliefs are not 
natural outputs themselves but result from natural outputs of our cognitive mechanisms via some 
intermediate steps. Stated as such, religious beliefs themselves do not come naturally but can rightly 
be called natural outcomes of our cognitive mechanisms. This approach is suggested by the first 
group of theories, discussed in section 2, and also by Barrett. It draws on ideas from dual process 
accounts of cognition where beliefs result from both online, fast, intuitive thinking and offline, 
slow, reflective thinking [28]. Barrett distinguishes nonreflective beliefs from reflective beliefs. 
Nonreflective belief is Barrett’s term for intuitive or natural beliefs and reflective beliefs are beliefs 
arrived at through conscious, deliberate mental activity. He argues nonreflective beliefs influence 
reflective beliefs in three important ways; they act as a default for reflective beliefs, they make 
(some) reflective beliefs more plausible and they shape memories and experiences [2, pp. 2–26]. 
Since reflective beliefs are thoroughly influenced by intuitive beliefs, claiming that the latter come 
natural will show that the former are trustworthy.  
This approach is problematic. Apart from the fact that it is hard to assess to what extent 
reflective religious beliefs are influenced by intuitive beliefs, a problem arises. Barrett’s view does 
not hold for the reflective beliefs of the major religions. In all major religious traditions at least 
some of the intuitive beliefs discussed in section two are contradicted. We already noted the 
mismatch between intuitive theistic beliefs and nontheistic religions. Christian doctrine contradicts 
the intuitive beliefs discussed by Barrett and Gray. In the Christian tradition, God’s activity in the 
world is limited so that most intuitive beliefs about invisible agency, which Barrett discusses, will 
be dismissed. For most Christians, morally bad events do not directly result from God’s agency but 
rather from sin or the fallen status of the world so the intuitive belief of God as ultimate moral agent 
will be dismissed. Most Christians will also portray God as forgiving in nature rather than 
punishing. Jewish and Islamic doctrine contradicts Kirkpatrick and Granqvist’s intuitive beliefs. 
The Jewish and Islamic traditions, where God is believed to be strictly transcendent, does not fit 
well with an intuitive belief in a comforting God who alleviates stress that defenders of the 
attachment theory discuss. Finally, Indian religions tend to contradict the intuitive beliefs discussed 
by Bloom and those of the third group of theories. Many Hindu traditions, Sikhism and Buddhism 
will discard the intuitive mind-body dualism and the intuitive moralizing nature of God. 
The fact that all major religious traditions subscribe to some intuitive beliefs and dismiss 
others poses no problems to their internal consistency because each tradition can serve as an 
overrider system.12 Each tradition can override certain intuitions on the basis of sacred texts, 
authority of important figures or knowledge from certain ritual practices. Sacred texts, authority of 
important figures and/or knowledge from certain ritual practices can thus be defeaters for intuitive 
beliefs. Christians can dismiss the intuitions that God is frequently intervening in nature and yet 
hold on to the intuitive belief in God’s moralizing and comforting nature because the latter beliefs 
are confirmed in the Bible whereas the former are denied. Muslims will base their objection to a 
comforting God by referring to Quranic surahs. Jews will do likewise by referring to the Torah. A 
follower of Hindu advaita vedanta might overrule her dualist intuitions because of the authority of 
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Adi Shankara’s writings or because of her experiences during yoga meditation. A Buddhist can 
refer to her experiences of unity with the universe during meditation.  
Furthermore, when religious traditions endorse intuitive beliefs, they usually don’t do this 
by merely claiming that they come natural but often claim they were confirmed by revelation, 
experience or reasoning. Natural beliefs thus appear to play some role in establishing religious 
beliefs’ trustworthiness, but their role is very limited because the authority of sacred texts, 
authoritative figures and knowledge from ritual practices is much greater. The question whether the 
traditions themselves are trustworthy falls beyond the scope of this paper. It is, however, clear that 
an appeal to naturalness is no longer warranted since natural beliefs are often discarded and when 
they are affirmed they are rendered trustworthy in other ways. 
 
5. What Does Come Natural 
 
We noted in the previous section that the evidence from cognitive science of religion is insufficient 
for defending the trustworthiness of religious beliefs and thus that Clark and Barrett’s claim does 
not hold water. Theories in cognitive science of religion do, however, claim that some beliefs come 
naturally and hence are trustworthy in the absence of defeaters if one subscribes to Clark and 
Barrett’s (and Plantinga’s) argument. I will discuss each of the three groups separately. 
Kelemen’s experiments provide evidence that the belief about teleology in natural comes 
natural. The experiments do show teleological beliefs receding when people learn mechanistic 
explanations but this only shows that in some or many cases there are defeaters. In cases where 
there are no such defeaters, teleological beliefs can thus still be trusted. Bloom’s intuitive mind-
body dualism also comes natural, but here there appear to be convincing defeaters. Modern science 
(especially neuroscience and psychology) show such an intimate connection between mental 
operations and the physical body that a strict separation between the two is implausible. Recent 
defenses of mind-body dualism [19], [42] also do not rely on intuitive beliefs. The naturalness of 
afterlife beliefs discussed by Bering and his colleagues supports the belief that physical death is not 
the end. Often this belief is overruled by a commitment to some form of physicalism.13 For those 
who do not subscribe to physicalism, the belief that life continues after death is supported. 
The intuitive theistic beliefs discussed by Barett, Gray and Bering support a form of theism 
closely resembling animism or spiritism as it is still practiced by indigenous tribes in Africa and 
America. Boyer discussed at length how many tribes believe that spirits are often interacting in the 
world and are morally concerned [12]. Animistic rituals and shamanism suggest that animistic 
spirits or gods are also believed to invest meaning in events. David Hume famously claimed that 
animism was the original religion from which all other religions developed [25], and Boyer makes a 
similar suggestion [12]. We noted that the development cannot be as straightforward as Hume and 
Boyer claim because religious traditions contradict many of the animistic beliefs. Nonetheless, 
animism can be deemed trustworthy when overrider systems like those of the major religious 
traditions are absent. 
The theories from the third group are interesting because they yield contradictory beliefs; on 
the first belief in a morally concerned, punishing god comes natural and on the second a loving 
forgiving god. the first thus gives trust for theistic beliefs resembling those of Judaism and Islam 
whereas the second gives trust for beliefs closer to those of Christianity and bhakti strands of 
Hinduism. Each of both theories can also be made compatible with the beliefs discussed by the 
second group of theories, yielding trust for an animism with punishing or loving gods and spirits. A 
combination seems difficult. This might signal that one of the two theories must be false or that 
both are incomplete. Assessing this falls beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
6. Conclusion 
  
In this paper I have argued that arguments to show that religious beliefs are trustworthy on the basis 
of their naturalness fail because religious beliefs are not natural. The beliefs of major religious 
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traditions differ greatly from the natural beliefs discussed by cognitive scientists and often even 
contradict them. Religious traditions can be consistent when rejecting natural beliefs because 
natural beliefs can be overridden by elements from their tradition, like sacred texts, authoritative 
figures or experiences during rituals.  
I have also argued that cognitive theories of religiouis belief do yield trust for some beliefs, 
namely some teleological beliefs, afterlife beliefs and animism. Two theories provide trust for 
contradicting beliefs; one in a punishing god and another in a loving forgiving god.  
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Notes 
                                                          
 
1. Clark and Barrett are not clear on what they mean by ‘rational’. For Plantinga, someone is rational if she has not 
violated any of her epistemic obligations. This fits well with Clark and Barrett’s argument. The term is, however, 
used in a wide variety of ways by epistemologists. In the remainder of this paper, I use the term ‘trustworthiness’ to 
avoid confusion. 
2. The term ‘cognitive mechanism’ is used to talk about specific functions of the human mind. Some cognitive 
scientists take a firmer stance and argue that cognitive mechanisms are distinct modules in the brain. Most cognitive 
scientists, however, take a more relaxed view. 
3. One could argue, like Plantinga, that testimonial beliefs also enjoy an innocent-until proven-guilty status. But then 
the trustworthiness of religious beliefs no longer depends on their naturalness like Clark and Barrett claim. 
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4. Plantinga distinguishes between rebutting and undercutting defeaters; rebutting defeaters being propositions that rule 
out the truth of a belief you hold and undercutting defeaters being propositions that are (inconclusive) reasons for 
giving up a belief.  
5. Plantinga primarily discusses Christian beliefs.  
6. Prominent cognitive scientists, besides Justin Barrett who defended this claim are Robert McCauley [33], Pascal 
Boyer [12] and Jesse Bering [8]. Of these, only Justin Barrett discusses the consequences of religious belief 
allegedly being natural for its trustworthiness. 
7. This distinction was popularized by Daniel Kahneman [28]). 
8. For example ,cognitive scientist Jonathan Jong writes: “(…) [C]entral tenets of the ECSR [evolutionary cognitive 
science of religion] are (…) notoriously under-determined by data, as anyone intimately familiar with the primary 
research literature knows.” [26] 
9. I take theistic religions to be religions that accept the existence of at least one god. This excludes among others 
Theravada Buddhism and religious naturalism. If the category gods is limited to creator gods, it also excludes other 
strands of Buddhism, Jainism, Taoism and animism. Obviously Barrett and Clark’s argument does not rule in favor 
of them.  
10. This point was also made in a somewhat different way by Jonathan Jong, Christopher Kavanagh and Aku Visala 
[27]. They, however, do not explicitly discuss the ramifications for the trustworthiness of religious beliefs. 
11. http://www.senate.be/doc/const_nl.html#const  
12. The term ‘overridder system’ was first used by William Alston [1].  
13. Physicalism is the philosophical doctrine that everything is material or physical.  
